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Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
and as requested by the Court of Appeals, appellant ("Republic") 
replies to the following points of law and points of fact, which 
the petitioners1 ("Won-Door) claim the court has overlooked or 
misapprehended in its September 7, 1994 opinion in this case. 
I 
CONTRARY TO WON-DOOR'S ARGUMENT, THE COURT CORRECTLY 
HELD THAT THERE ARE GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACTS AS 
TO WHAT THE PARTIES MEANT IN THE AUGUST 22 AGREEMENT BY 
"LEUCADIA OR ANY OTHER OF THE TEN LISTED QUALIFIED 
COMPANIES" 
Won-Door argues that this Court has incorrectly held that 
the August 22 Agreement is ambiguous on its face because the 
August 22 Agreement was in fact a two-page agreement in that the 
May 21 Letter was attached to the August 22 Agreement at the time 
of its signing,1 Won-Door also argues that even if extrinsic 
evidence is considered, there is no dispute as to what the 
parties intended by the phrase "Leucadia or any other of the ten 
Although Won-Door now argues in its Petition for Rehearing 
that this Court has misapprehended this fact, in its prior 
arguments to this Court Won-Door took the position that the August 
22 Agreement was, in fact, a one-page agreement. On page 26 of its 
Brief to this Court, Won-Door states: 
"The Verified Complaint in this case asserts that there 
were two written contracts: the first contract was 
Watkins1 letter of March 26, 1986 which applied only to 
a sale of 22% of the Won-Door stock at a price of $42.00 
per shares; the second contract was the one-page 
hand-written agreement of August 22, 1986 which applied 
to a sale of all of Won-Door stock and would entitle 
Republic to a commission fee if the stock was sold to 
certain identified companies." (Emphasis added). 
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listed qualified companies". In support of these arguments, 
Won-Door relies upon the fact that Exhibit "E" to Republic's 
Amended Verified Complaint contained both the heindwritten August 
22 Agreement and the Letter of May 21, 1986, and upon selected 
portions of testimony of Irvin D. Bird, Jr. ("Bird") at his 
deposition. 
Admittedly, Exhibit "E" to the Complaint consists of the 
handwritten agreement of August 22 and the Letter of May 21, 
1986. 
In light of the fact that subsequent to the August 22 
Agreement, Republic became aware of the fact that Reed A. Watkins 
("Watkins") was claiming that the list of ten qualified companies 
was, in fact, the May 21 Letter, the allegation found in 
Paragraph 24 of the Verified Complaint, particularly when viewed 
in light of remaining allegations of the Complaint, is ambiguous 
and clearly does not rise to a statement of fact or admission 
that, in fact, the letter of May 21, 1986 was attached and 
incorporated to the agreement at the time it was signed or there 
was a meeting of the minds at the time the parties entered into 
the August 22 Agreement. 
Similarly, Won-Door's reliance on portions of the Deposition 
of Irvin Bird is misplaced. 
Republic submits that the testimony of Bird cited by 
Won-Door is ambiguous, and, more importantly, does not fairly 
reflect Bird's testimony at his deposition on this issue. 
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The issues now raised by Won-Door concerning the Verified 
Complaint and Bird's understanding of the August 22 Agreement 
were more directly addressed in later examination of Bird which 
has not been quoted by Won-Door. 
Q: [Faber] Mr. Watkins wrote this out [August 
22, Exhibit "E"] including the provision for the $5,000 
and the conditions under which Republic Group would be 
entitled fee, and you and Mr. McSwain and Mr. Watkins 
signed this document? 
A: [Bird] Yes. 
Q: [Faber] And apparently the May 21, '86 
exhibit was attached. Is that correct? 
A: [Bird] I don't believe it was attached at the 
time, but it might be—it's attached here, yes. 
Q: [Faber] It's attached in your Complaint, too, 
isn't it Mr. Bird? 
A: [Bird] I would personally think it would 
include both this exhibit and also the exhibit that we 
have in the Complaint as Exhibit "D" which we have here 
as Exhibit "D", the May 27th document whatever the 
exhibit number is, I thought it included those as well. 
It included Drexel Burnham, for example, who was a 
purchaser, they were a viable purchaser, and should 
have included Thermal Systems, who was a viable 
purchaser. It should have included all those that we 
worked out with the expressed interest in the company. 
(Deposition of Irvin Bird, pages 87-88, attached hereto 
as Appendix I). 
Clearly, Bird's impression was that no list was attached and 
made part of the August 22 Agreement at the time it was signed, 
but that Bird may have been confused at his deposition due to the 
fact that the May 21 Letter was attached to the exhibit that was 
presented to him by Faber at his deposition. Further, it is 
clear that Bird did not acknowledge that the May 21 Letter 
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represented his understanding of what was meant in the August 22 
Agreement by "the ten listed qualified companies". 
The fact that the May 21 letter was not attached to the 
August 22 Agreement is further supported by the fact that in its 
memoranda to the trial court, Republic clearly argued that the 
agreement was a one-page, not a two-page, agreement and that the 
May 21 Letter was not attached to the August 22 Agreement. 
(Record, pp. 466-467). However, Watkins1 Affidavit filed in 
response to Republic's arguments states in Paragraph 24 through 
25 as follows: 
24. To avoid any misunderstanding we agreed that 
the fee formula should be confirmed in writing. I then 
drafted the agreement in the presence of Bird and Mark. 
25. After discussing Perry's letter and the 
May 21, '87 agreement, we concluded the handwritten fee 
agreement dated August 22nd and the three of us signed 
it. (Affidavit of Watkins, Record, page 302). 
In his Affidavit, Watkins does not even suggest that the May 21st 
Agreement was, in fact, attached to the August 22 Agreement as an 
exhibit. 
Further, the undisputed testimony is there was substantial 
and lengthy disagreement between Watkins and Bird, and even 
Republic's lawyer, both before and at the August 22nd meeting, as 
to which companies would be included, if any, as exclusions to 
the Boettcher agreement. Nevertheless, Watkins chose to go 
around Republic's lawyer and go directly to the principals of 
Republic to negotiate such fee. Under such circumstance, the 
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fact that Watkins, a lawyer, simply did not add a clause directly 
referring to the May 21 letter stating, for example, "as listed 
on the Letter of May 21st attached hereto", can be viewed as 
evidence that no meeting of the minds occurred and that Watkins, 
in fact, intended to maintain the confusion as to what was meant 
by "the ten listed qualified companies". 
Won-Door's argument found in Footnote 9 to its Petition that 
it is undisputed that the May 21 Letter was submitted to 
Boettcher by Watkins as the list of ten exclusions is also 
incorrect. Watkins clearly states in Paragraph 16 of his 
Affidavit that he also gave Boettcher the list of May 27, 1986 
which contains the name of Thermal System, Inc. (Record, 
p. 300). 
Won-Door also must acknowledge that just prior to the Motion 
for Summary Judgment, Boettcher, pursuant to Subpoena Duces 
Tecum, produced its entire file for all of the parties' 
inspection and copying. (Record, pp. 165-170). Although 
Boettcher's files contain a variety of correspondence from the 
Smarts and one letter from Watkins, nowhere in the Boettcher 
files are found any of the lists provided to Watkins by Republic 
nor is there any correspondence from Watkins (or anyone else) in 
any way addressing the ten exclusions to the Boettcher agreement. 
Further, it is clear that, for some as of yet unexplained 
reason, Boettcher discounted the fee that it would otherwise be 
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entitled to under its agreement with Watkins by some Fifty 
Percent (50%). 
At the time of the hearing on the Motion for Summary 
Judgment discovery was continuing and there were outstanding 
unresponded to requests for documents to Watkins and Watkins1 
deposition was yet to be taken. Under these circumstances, 
Republic respectfully submits that the fact that there is no 
documentary evidence in Boettcher's file that any list was ever 
submitted to Boettcher, and that for some unexplained reason, 
Boettcher compromised its fee, when viewed in light most 
favorable to Republic, can be taken as evidence that Watkins not 
only failed to come to a clear understanding with Republic as to 
who the ten exclusions, but may have failed to come to an 
agreement with Boettcher as to who the ten exclusions were, 
possibly in an attempt to avoid both fees. 
Won-Door also argues the language "Leucadia or any of the 
other qualified ten listed companies" necessarily ties this 
language to the May 21 Letter in that the May 21 Letter is the 
only list which comes close to having ten (10) companies. 
Clearly, the language "ten qualified listed companies" comes from 
the requirement of Boettcher agreement and to argue that the May 
21 list consequently must be the list to which Republic agreed 
only begs the question and is entirely self-serving. 
Won-Doorfs argument that it was Republic's attorney, Doug 
Perry, who coined the language also inaccurately states the 
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facts. Watkins1 in his affidavit describes his conversation with 
Douglas Perry as follows: 
20. In August of '86, I received a telephone call 
from Mr. Douglas Perry who identified himself as an 
attorney representing Bird and Republic. He said he 
called to clarify the fee arrangement I had with his 
clients in regard to the sale of Won-Door. I explained 
to Mr. Perry, while I had an exclusive agreement with 
Boettcher for the sale of Won-Door, there was a list of 
ten exceptions granted to Republic. This list 
contained the names of Leucadia and ten other companies 
and if the sale were consummated with Leucadia or one 
of the other ten, Republic was entitled to a commission 
based on the Leman formula. 
21. On August 22, I received a letter from Mr. 
Perry dated August 20. In his letter, Mr. Perry 
correctly identified the companies "Leucadia or any of 
the other qualified ten listed companies" for which 
Republic would be entitled to a fee. However, his 
compensation to fee was not the Leman formula. 
(Affidavit of Reed Watkins, Record pp. 297-304). 
It is clear from even Watkins1 version of the Perry conversation 
that there was no direct reference to the May 21 Letter of 1993 
in his conversation with Perry, nor is there anything in Watkins1 
Affidavit that clearly addresses what Perry and Watkins meant by 
the ten qualified companies. In fact, when viewed in a light 
most favorable to the Republic, Watkins1 conversation with Perry 
could be viewed as attempt by Watkins to mislead Perry by 
implying to Perry that the Boettcher agreement already contained 
a list of ten qualified companies (which it did not) or that 
Republic had already agreed to a list of ten qualified companies 
(which Republic clearly had not). 
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This Court correctly ruled, in light of all the facts and 
evidence in the record pertaining to the Motion for Summary 
Judgment and the inferences that may be drawn therefrom when 
viewed in a light most favorable to Republic, that there is a 
genuine and material issue of fact as to whether there was a 
meeting of the minds on August 22, 1986 when the parties entered 
into the August 22 Agreement. 
II 
CONTRARY TO WON-DOOR'S ARGUMENT, THE COTTONWOOD MALL V. 
SINE CASE IS FULLY CONSISTENT WITH AND SUPPORTS THIS 
COURT'S HOLDING THAT THERE ARE GENUINE AND MATERIAL 
FACTS AS TO WHETHER THE MARCH 12 LETTER AGREEMENT WAS 
IN PLACE AT THE TIME OF THE AUGUST 22 HANDWRITTEN 
AGREEMENT 
In its opinion in this case, this Court rejects Won-Door's 
reliance upon Pinaree v. Continental Group of Utah. Inc., 558 
P.2d 317 (Utah, 1976). In so doing, this Court correctly 
distinguishes Pinaree as follows: 
However, the present situation is distinguishable from 
the one in Pingree, where the trial court erred in 
inferred a reasonable rent. In Pinaree, the trial 
court interpreted the contract terms implying a 
reasonable rent. Id. at 1321. Here, the evidence, 
when viewed in a light most favorable to Republic, 
could support a finding that the reasonable fee is what 
the parties actually agree to, and the exact dollar 
amount would be settled in the future. Also, the 
contract in Pinaree was set in the criteria for 
determining the rent five (5) years in the future fid, 
at 1320) when the parties had, likely, little idea what 
reasonable rent might be. In our case, the parties had 
already agreed that Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars 
($250,000.00) would be the appropriate fee if 
Twenty-Two Percent (22%) of Won-Door was sold. A 
little more than five (5) months later the parties 
finally agreed to a scheme where Republic would have 
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received Four Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars 
($450,000.00) if all of the Won-Door stock was sold to 
an appropriate party for Thirty-Five Million Dollars 
($35,000,000.00). Accordingly, the determination of a 
reasonable fee would neither conflict with the express 
contract terms nor be extremely difficult to 
accomplish. Thus, we find genuine issues of material 
fact which must be resolved to determine whether a 
contract was in place and, if so, what the terms of the 
agreement were at the time of the alleged breach of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (Opinion, 
Republic v. Won-Door. dated September 7, 1994 at pages 
8-9) . 
In its Petition for Rehearing, Won-Door argues that the 
Supreme Court in Cottonwood Mall v. Sine, 767 P.2d 499 (Utah, 
1988) , has broadened its prior holding in Pinaree in such a 
manner as to render the opinion in this case, distinguishing 
Pinaree, to be contrary to Utah law. 
In fact, a careful reading of Cottonwood Mall discloses that 
Cottonwood Mall does not broaden the Court's holding in Pinaree 
but simply applies the holding in Pinaree to narrower facts and, 
like Pinaree, the Cottonwood Mall case does not apply to the 
facts found in this case. 
In Cottonwood Mall, the parties entered into a lease in 1961 
for a bowling alley located at the Cottonwood Mall. Apparently, 
the lease contained no option to renew. In 1979, approximately 
two (2) years before the expiration of the time the lease was to 
expire, the tenant's ("Sine") realtors approached the owner of 
Cottonwood Mall (Horman) asking to negotiate a renewal. Horman, 
on two (2) occasions, advised Sine's real estate agents that he 
would be willing to negotiate a renewal upon reasonable terms, 
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but, refused to enter into negotiations, telling Sine that he 
would not negotiate a new lease at that time because of 
uncertainty of inflation and instability of the rental market. 
More specifically, Horman was unwilling to enter into another 
lease, either long-term or short-term, unless he could consider 
the costs of operating and owning the building as they compared 
to the amount of rent. Horman only indicated to Sine that he 
would be willing to enter into a new lease at a reasonable figure 
and at the appropriate time. 
Contrary to the Won-Door's description of the facts of the 
Cottonwood Mall case, there were no lengthy negotiations between 
Horman and Sine. 
In Cottonwood Mall, Sine argued that the Pingree case was 
distinguishable because, unlike Pingree, there were no specific 
circumstances listed in the alleged agreement between Sine and 
Horman upon which a reasonable rent should be based and, 
therefore, the task of implying a reasonable rent is less 
complicated. The Court rejected this argument, stated it would 
follow Pingree and held that in determining what is reasonable 
rent many factors must be weighed and put into an equation and 
that business judgments must be made and cited the uncertainties 
of inflation and the instability of the commercial leasing 
market. Again, the Court made particular note that Horman 
refused to enter into negotiations with Sine because of these 
factors. 
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In Pinaree. the Court found that while the lease listed 
criteria for the basis of the terms of a negotiation, it found 
that the Court's determination had nullified the express factors 
specified by the parties in the lease and had substituted a new 
agreement to which the parties did not commit themselves and 
further held that the option to renew was too vague and 
indefinite to be enforceable. 
By contrast, in the Cottonwood Mall case there simply were 
no factors that Horman and Sine agreed to look to in negotiating 
a "reasonable rent" upon which the trial court could make a 
decision as to what would be a reasonable rent. 
In short, the Cottonwood Mall case does not broaden the 
holding of Pinaree, but directly follows the holding of Pinaree 
on more compelling facts. 
Additionally, in both Pinaree and Cottonwood Mall, the Court 
cites to and relies upon the majority rule stated in Slater v. 
Paisley, 264 P.2d 44 (Oregon, 1953). The majority rule, as 
stated in Slater, is: 
"Where a substantial part of a contract is left open 
for further settlement without a cannon by which the 
subsequent negotiations may be controlled, there is no 
aggreaatio mentium so essential to every contract." 
(Emphasis by the Court). Slater, at page 449). 
However, as correctly observed by this Court in this case, 
the parties agreed specifically in the March 12 Letter Agreement 
as to what a reasonable fee would be for Twenty-Two Percent (22%) 
of the company and then entered into various negotiations all 
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consistent with the March 12 criteria as to what an appropriate 
fee would be if all of Won-Door was sold and in less than five 
(5) months, did, in fact, agree upon a reasonable fee for the 
sale of all of the stock of Won-Door. 
In this case the canon by which subsequent negotiations were 
to be controlled was clearly stated in the March 12, 1986 Letter 
Agreement. Won-Door has pointed to no facts or conditions 
existing at the time of the March 12 Agreement which would render 
this "canon" in any way vague or subject to the uncertainties 
which concerned the Court in either the Pinaree or the Cottonwood 
Mall case. 
SUMMARY 
Republic respectfully submits that the Court correctly 
distinguished and refused to apply the Pingree case to invalidate 
the March 12, 1986 agreement and that the Cottonwood Mall v. Sine 
case, does not render this Court's decision incorrect and, in 
fact, is supportive of its decision in this case. Further, this 
Court correctly held that there are genuine issues of material 
fact as to whether there was a meeting of the minds when the 
parties entered into the August 22 Agreement. Accordingly, 
Won-Door's Petition for Rehearing should be denied. 
DATED this 5 \ day of October, 1994. 
RICHARD K. CRk#DAEL 
Attorney for Appellant 
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APPENDIX I 
87 
interprets it. 
MR. WTLKINS: Counsel, correct me if I'm wrong, 
but I understand your question to be did Mr. Bird sign it. 
MR. FABER: After it was written. 
MR. WILKINS: I think the question, Mr. Bird, is, 
is this the document you signed and did you sign it. 
THE WITNESS: That's correct. I thought we were 
discussing the meaning of that paragraph. I'm sorry. 
Q (By Mr. Faber) We were. We were discussing 
both, but I can go back to that now. In any case, Mr. 
Vatkins vrcte this out including the provision for the 
$5,000 and the conditions under which Republic Group would 
be entitled to a fee, and you and Mr. McSwain and Mr. 
Watkins then signed this document? 
A Yes. 
Q And apparently the May 21st, '86 exhibit was 
attached; is that correct? 
A I don't believe it was attached at the time, but 
might be—it's attached here, yes, 
Q It's attached in your complaint, too, isn't it, 
Mr. Bird? 
A I would personally think it would include both 
this exhibit and also the exhibit that we have in the 
complaint as Exhibit D, which we have here as Exhibit D, the 
27th of May document, whatever the exhibit number is, I 
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT 
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thought it included those as well. It included Drexel 
Burnham, for example, who was a purchaser, they were a 
viable purchaser, should have included Thermal Systems who 
was a viable purchaser, it should have included all of those 
that we had worked with that expressed an interest in the 
company. 
Q Okay, but in any case— 
A Including Leucadia. 
Q —in any case, on August the 22nd, 1986 Mr. 
Watkins comes into your office, and the reason he comes in 
is because he's received Mr. Parry's letter and he said 
that's not our deal; is that correct? 
A Well, he's furious that if Dan Berman's going to 
sue him, to use that term, that will go on forever to 
resolve this issue, and the thrust was Leucadia, because 
tomorrow morning we're going to have a meeting with Leucadia 
at which time we expected a cash offer. 
Q Now, when you say we're going to have a meeting, 
who do you mean by that? 
A Reed Watkins, Mark McSwain, and I — 
Q Oh, you mean the— 
A —Leucadia—Reed and I and Larry Pinnock was to 
have a meeting at Leucadia offices at East South Temple. 
Q The next morning? 
A The next morning. 
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